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Abstract 
 
 We assembled a database consisting of fifty two regulatory decisions, 
involving two hundred and fifty four annual observations, made by seven 
different regulators and across five different industries. For each of these 
observations we construct a variable that represents the proportion of the firms’ 
cost claims that were disallowed by the regulator when determining the 
maximum revenue. We then attempt to explain this fraction by using categorical 
variables representing the regulator, the industry and the time period.  Our 
empirical results suggest that we can explain fifty per cent of the variance in the 
sample by using these simple categorical variables. Moreover, our results suggest 
that despite the differences in the implementation of price regulation across 
regulated industries and across jurisdictions in Australia, outcomes are 
surprisingly consistent. For example, we show that it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that the regulatory outcomes in South Australia, New South Wales, 
the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria are similar. In the same vein, we 
observe that regulatory outcomes in transmission (electricity and gas) are similar 
to each other and so are the outcomes in distribution (electricity and gas).  We 
also find that the nature of ownership of regulated firms (private vs. public) has 
little impact on the proportion of disallowed cost claims.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Productivity Commission (2004-a) estimates the total value of government-
owned assets in water (including sewerage and irrigation), electricity, rail, ports 
and urban transport at approximately $125 billion. If one adds the value of total 
assets of the telecommunications and gas industries and the value of total assets 
in these industries under private ownership, it is possible to conclude that the 
total value of assets in the energy, water, telecommunications and transport 
industries add up to over $150 billion. 
 
These industries underwent significant changes in the 1990s along the lines 
prescribed by the Hilmer report. These changes included privatisation, 
corporatisation, and vertical separation of government owned enterprises.  The 
separation of natural monopoly components from segments where competition 
could be introduced was accomplished either by actual separation or by the 
requirements of firms to unbundle the goods and services they provide.  
 
The natural monopoly segments were re-regulated with the introduction of 
industry specific access regimes and the establishment of independent 
regulators. Competitive segments were subjected to industry specific regulatory 
frameworks and of course were also subjected to competition law.  
 
For example, the electricity industry, which was previously characterised by 
vertically integrated firms, was restructured and divided into generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail businesses.  The natural monopoly elements 
of the industry, distribution and transmission, were subjected to price regulation 
and, in principle, the other two elements of the industry, generation and retail, 
were de-regulated with the requirement that generators sell and retailers buy 
their electricity through the electricity spot market (the pool). 1 
 
Price regulation of the natural monopoly elements of these industries usually 
takes the form of maximum prices that these businesses are allowed to charge for 
the services they provide.2  Who sets these maximum prices and how they are set 
depends very much on the industry.  
                                                 
1 The practice, however, is more complex. For example, retail prices have remained regulated 
despite the introduction of full retail contestability in many jurisdictions. Similarly, there are 
many services associated with the distribution of electricity (e.g., remote meter reading) that 
might not be natural monopolies. In the same vein, new (and existing) transmission links might 
not be natural monopolies in as much as they can compete with existing links.   
2 In this discussion we ignore the issue of service regulation. This is an area that has evolved over 
the last couple of years where in addition to maximum prices that businesses can charge, there 
are some minimum standards that have to be satisfied. For example, in electricity distribution, 
there are minimum requirements for reliability (e.g., number of minutes of interruptions of 
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For example, the maximum prices that can be charged by electricity and gas 
transmission businesses are set by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)3.  Economic regulators in the states and territories set the 
maximum prices to be charged by gas and electricity distribution and water 
businesses.   
 
In Australia, the dominant regulatory practice is such that maximum prices are 
not set directly. Instead, regulators determine the efficient costs to provide a 
particular service (usually in a forward looking manner – for example, for the 
next five years) and this generates the maximum allowable revenue that a 
business can generate.  This model is known as the building blocks approach to 
price regulation.  Very significantly, these efficient costs include the costs on and 
of capital, in addition to operational expenditures. 
 
Based on the maximum allowable revenue, prices of individual services are then 
calculated by using, for example, forecasted demand or the quantities observed 
in previous periods. That is, prices are linked to costs through the maximum 
allowable revenue and the demand function.  
 
Although the general principles for setting prices are similar across different 
jurisdictions and different industries, there still remains scope for significant 
differences on how these principles are implemented.   
 
For example, the allowed rate of return, which is embedded in the determination 
of efficient capital costs, varies quite considerably across jurisdictions and 
industries.4 Other examples that illustrate the scope for variation in the 
implementation of price regulation include the existence of efficiency carryover 
mechanisms in some jurisdictions and for some industries5, different rights of 
                                                                                                                                                 
service per year) and some regulators have imposed penalties and bonuses associated with 
accomplishing these service requirements. 
3 With the exception of some significant gas transmission pipelines inside the Western Australian 
state boundary and for electricity transmission in Western Australia and the Northern Territory. 
4 See, for example, NECG (2003) for an international comparison of rates of return in regulatory 
decisions. 
5 To illustrate how these mechanisms work, consider a five-year regulatory period. In many 
jurisdictions, if a firm spends less than its allowable efficient costs say in the fourth year of the 
regulatory period, then the firm can retain the additional profits for only one more year, with the 
new prices being set at the lower efficient cost. This of course might lead a firm to postpone 
process innovations that reduce costs until the beginning of the new regulatory period. An 
efficiency carryover mechanism instead allows the firm to carry over the cost savings for the next 
five years. 
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appeal across industries6, and whether maximum prices are determined by a 
revenue cap or a weighted average price cap.   
 
One could take this diversity of approaches to price regulation across 
jurisdictions and across industries as a prima facie case of regulatory mayhem.  
In this paper we provide some evidence to suggest that this conclusion would be 
premature.  In particular, we assemble a database containing fifty-two regulatory 
decisions across electricity and gas transmission and distribution and water. For 
these decisions, we construct a variable that reflects the difference between the 
regulated firms’ cost claims and the maximum revenue allowable by regulators.   
 
The basic idea is best illustrated by a simple example. Consider two such 
decisions: decision A and decision B. If we could control for all objective 
differences between these two decisions (for example, by controlling for the 
regulator, the industry, the point in time at which the regulation decision is 
made, etc), then we should expect decisions A and B to be consistent, that is, they 
should yield the same ratio of cost claims to allowable revenue.  Another way to 
express the same idea is to say that if we had the same regulator making 
decisions A and B in the same industry, regarding the same firm and in the same 
year, then we would expect the two decisions to be the same. That is, our task is 
to examine the extent to which price regulatory decisions have been applied 
consistently across industries and across jurisdictions in Australia. 
 
In this paper we provide evidence that despite the differences in the 
implementation of price regulation across regulated industries and across 
jurisdictions, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the regulatory 
outcomes in South Australia, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) and Victoria are similar. We also provide evidence that the Queensland 
and Western Australia regulators are consistent with one another, but are 
associated with regulatory outcomes that seem tougher than those of the 
regulators in South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, and the ACT, 
controlling for the industry and the time period.  
 
Finally, we would like to be able to assess how the regulatory decisions taken by 
federal regulator, the ACCC, relate to those taken by the state regulators. The 
difficulty in conducting this assessment is the lack of overlap in the industries 
being regulated.  We provide some lower and upper bounds that are consistent 
with both the notion that the ACCC is tougher and that it is less tough than state 
regulators.     
 
                                                 
6 Firms in the gas industry, for example, can appeal to the Australian Competition Tribunal on 
merit grounds. In contrast, there is no provision for appeals on merit grounds for firms in the 
electricity industry. 
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Our paper fits naturally with a recent literature that aims to explain the 
variability of regulatory outcomes. For example, Figueiredo, Jr. and Edwards 
(2004) observe that regulated prices for access to the local loops of incumbent 
telephone networks vary substantially from one US state to another and across 
time. This difference remains even after controlling for technological and 
geographic cost considerations.7 These authors find that within state variation in 
political and institutional environment can explain part of the variability.   
 
In a similar vein, Edwards and Waverman (2004) study regulated interconnect 
rates paid by entrant firms to incumbent firms in EU telecommunications. Again 
interconnect rates are in principle set with regards to costs. However, these 
authors find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these 
interconnect rates, although the presence of institutional features enhancing 
regulatory independence mitigates this effect.  
 
Now that we have explained what this paper does, it is appropriate to explain 
what this paper does not do. While we provide evidence that price regulation 
has been reasonably consistent across industries and jurisdictions (with some 
exceptions), our analysis is silent on how effective this regulation has been. This 
is an important theme for future research.8  
 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide some brief 
description of the institutional framework of each of the industries that we 
analyse. Section 3 contains the conceptual framework and a description of our 
empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the database that we assembled and 
presents our empirical results. In Section 5 we investigate whether the nature of 
ownership of regulated firms can explain the variability of our endogenous 
variable. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 After all, regulators are required to set prices with reference to economic criteria -- primarily 
some measure of costs. 
8 The recent Productivity Commission Review of the Gas Access Regime (Productivity 
Commission, 2004-b) provided an opportunity for an evaluation of regulatory outcomes. In our 
view, the review highlighted that there is no perfect approach.  For example, more investment is 
not necessarily an indicator of regulatory success – an effective regulatory system may increase 
the efficiency and/or length of life of capital and therefore reduce investor requirement.  
Similarly, reductions of prices to consumers may not be an indicator of regulatory success as 
lower prices might result in lower levels of reliability and innovation.  Our approach suggests 
that it might be possible to explain how investments (WACC, etc.) are determined and, therefore, 
to investigate the effects of regulation on outcomes.  
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2.  The Institutional Framework 
 
The institutional arrangements that have prevailed since the deregulation of the 
network utility sectors have seen regulatory responsibilities spread between 
State, Territory and national regulators.  Even within industries, different 
segments of the supply chain have been regulated by different regulators and at 
different jurisdictional levels.  This practice has seen distinct implementations of 
the underlying principles of price regulation.   
 
The remainder of this section will describe the different regulatory frameworks 
that apply for the industry sectors covered in this study.   
 
Electricity  
 
The responsibility for electricity regulation in Australia has been divided 
amongst State, Territory and national regulators since the introduction of 
deregulation.  As part of the deregulation process a National Electricity Market 
(NEM) was developed.  This market comprises Queensland, New South Wales, 
Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and South Australia.  Tasmania will also 
physically join the NEM once the Basslink Interconnector is commissioned.  
Jurisdictions in the NEM are required to regulate the electricity industry 
according to an industry access code developed under Part IIIA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974; the National Electricity Code (NEC).   
 
Price regulation for transmission networks is conducted according to Part C of 
the NEC, while Part E prescribes the rules for distribution pricing.  Price 
regulation under the NEC is focused on an incentive based mechanism that 
applies a CPI-X approach.  The regulation of electricity transmission companies 
in NEM jurisdictions is currently conducted by the ACCC. Distribution 
companies are regulated via the relevant State or Territory based economic 
regulator.   
 
While the ACCC regulates electricity transmission under the NEC, there is 
sufficient scope within the NEC to allow the ACCC to interpret regulatory 
pricing components as it wishes.  Therefore, consistent with the introductory 
explanation to Chapter 6 of the NEC, the ACCC has been developing a Statement 
of Regulatory Intent.  This Statement, currently still in draft form, is known as 
the ‘Draft Statement of Principles for the Regulation of Transmission Revenue’.   
The purpose of this document is to provide clarity to market participants on how 
the ACCC intends to regulate transmission companies. 
 
Section 6.11(e) of the NEC allows State-based regulators to develop alternative 
pricing principles to those set out in Part E of the NEC.  As a result, the form of 
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regulation has developed differently amongst State-based regulators.  For 
example, while the NSW regulator has applied a revenue cap regime, the 
Victorian regulator has applied a price cap regime.    In addition, other incentive 
based mechanisms of the regulatory regime can also vary.  For instance, Victoria 
is currently the only jurisdiction to apply a service incentive scheme and an 
efficiency carryover mechanism.  These instruments are designed to promote 
efficiency by allowing the businesses to hold onto efficiency benefits achieved 
while also setting service quality targets to ensure that an appropriate level of 
service is maintained.      
 
For those jurisdictions that are outside the NEM, State-based regulation applies 
for both transmission and distribution regulation.  Increasingly, non-NEM states 
are moving towards regulatory regimes similar to the NEM style of price control. 
 
Gas 
 
Gas industry regulation in Australia is conducted under the National Third Party 
Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipelines (the Gas Access Regime).  This regime 
applies to third party access to natural gas transmission and distribution 
pipelines.  Underpinning the Gas Access Regime is the National Third Party 
Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (the Gas Code).  Unlike for 
electricity, the Gas Access Regime operates in each State and Territory through 
the corresponding gas law.   
 
The Gas Access Regime in Australia only applies to pipelines that are ‘covered’ 
under the regime.  That is, covered pipeline operators are required to have an 
access arrangement in place.  Transmission pipeline access arrangements are the 
responsibility of the ACCC9, while distribution pipelines are the responsibility of 
State or Territory based economic regulators.  As a result, differences in 
interpretation of the Gas Code can evolve over time.       
 
Water 
 
Water regulation in Australia is conducted on a State and Territory basis with 
different jurisdictional arrangements applying between States and Territories.  
Generally there has been a trend over recent years for water pricing regulatory 
frameworks to move towards a user pays system to reflect the scarcity of the 
resource.  Water pricing decisions usually consider bulk water, storm water, 
wastewater as well as general water supply services.  Water price regulation is 
conducted under specific State and Territory based water legislation with 
regulatory powers provided through the legislation specific to the regulator.   
                                                 
9 Except for Western Australia.   
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3.  The Analytical framework and the empirical strategy 
 
Our aim is to examine the consistency of regulatory decisions across jurisdictions 
and across industries. In particular, we want to explain the relationship between 
firms’ cost claims and the regulator’s allowable costs as a function of variables 
such as the nature of the industry, the regulator, and the time period. 
 
That is, we are mainly interested in the difference between Y -- defined as a 
firm’s cost claims measured in dollars -- and MAR – the maximum allowable 
revenue. As we want our measure of firms’ cost claims to be unit free, we instead 
define the following variable: 
 
(1.1) t tt
t
Y MARy
Y
−=  
 
These variables are indexed by t, which denotes the year for which the cost claim 
has been made. Note that in principle we have 0 1ty< <  as in one extreme the 
regulator can set the maximum allowable revenue to exactly cover the firm’s cost 
claims making 0ty = .10 In the other extreme, the regulator sets the maximum 
allowable revenue to zero making 1.ty =  Alternatively, 0.5ty =  indicates that for 
this particular year and this particular decision, the firm was allowed to recover 
fifty per cent of the costs it claimed. Similarly, 0.3ty =  indicates that for this 
particular year and this particular decision, the firm was allowed to recover 
seventy per cent of the costs it claimed. 
 
Variable y, the fraction of firms’ cost claims that are disallowed by the regulator, 
is what we aim to explain.  The interpretation of y, however, is not trivial. For 
example, if regulators had access to an efficiometer, a clever machine that 
measures precisely the extent to which firms’ cost claims are efficient, then y 
could be interpreted as a measure of firm’s deviation from the efficiency frontier; 
a higher y indicating a more inefficient firm.  By the same token, in the absence of 
an efficiometer and if firms’ behaviour across industries were the same, then y can 
be interpreted as a measure of the toughness of the regulator, a higher y 
indicating a tougher regulator. In our approach, we control for the possibility 
that the behaviour of firms in gas distribution is different from the behaviour of 
firms in gas transmission or electricity or water. We also control for the 
possibility that different regulators behave differently and we allow their 
behaviour to change over time.   
 
                                                 
10 In practice it is possible to observe 0.ty < This can be the result, for example, of the regulator 
allowing the firm to anticipate to period t certain expenses that would be incurred at a later date. 
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That is, we estimate the following equation 
 
(1.2) ' ' ' ,
r iirt t irt
y RD ID TDα β γ δ ε= + + + +  
 
where subscripts irt indicate, respectively, the industry, regulator and time of the 
decision,  RD are dummy variables indicating which regulator took the decision, 
ID are dummy variables representing the industry to which the decision applies, 
and TD are dummy variables representing the time period11.   a, b, d, and g are 
parameters to be estimated while irtε  is a random term.   We estimate the model 
with different restrictions on the correlation of irtε  below.    The model may be 
viewed as a three-way error component model.  A typical two-way model would 
have an effect for industry and one for time.  Here we also have a regulator 
effect.  The results are described in the next section. Below we simply describe 
the pattern of our dependent variable over regulator, industry and time of 
regulation. 
 
Figures 1a and 1b report the behaviour of y across the seven regulators under 
consideration.  The raw data suggests some consistency across state regulators 
with the exception of the Western Australia regulator whose pattern of the y 
variable is somewhat similar to that of the ACCC. 
 
Figure 1a: Value of y by regulator 
 
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
VIC NSW QLD WA SA ACT ACCC
 
 
                                                 
11 For example, consider a decision by the ACT regulator regarding gas distribution in 2002. In this case, 
the dummy variables representing the ACT regulator, the gas industry and the year 2002 will all have a 
value equal to one, whereas all other dummy variables will be equal to zero.  
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Figure 1b: Value of y by regulator 
Blocks show 50% of values closest to mean.  Bars show full 
range of values.
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Figures 2a and 2b report the pattern of our dependent variable across the five 
industries under consideration. The raw data suggests a similarity between gas 
and electricity within distribution and transmission but indicate a clear 
distinction between transmission and distribution. 
 
Figure 2a: Value of y by industry 
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Figure 2b: Value of y by industry 
 
Blocks show 50% of values closest to mean.  Bars show full range of 
values.
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Fig
ure 3 reports the pattern of our dependent variable over time. No particular 
trend seems to arise.  Figure 4 is an estimate of the density of y using non-
parametric, kernel density estimation.   We note the bimodality in the 
distribution of y and we explore this below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Value of y over time 
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Figure 4: Distribution of y 
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4.  The Data and Empirical Results 
 
The data used in this study is presented as the revenue requirement of the 
business compared to the revenue determination of the regulator.  The data is 
presented on a financial year basis over the corresponding regulatory period.  
Those decisions that are made on a calendar year basis are presented as the 
earliest financial year that corresponds to the calendar year to provide simplicity. 
 
The method used to obtain the data was to search the websites of all Australian 
utility regulators for their regulatory pricing determinations.  Therefore, the data 
is limited to those decisions where the regulator has provided the information of 
both the proposal and the determination on the Internet.  In most cases the 
business proposed revenue requirement and the regulators maximum allowable 
revenue determination were found in the regulator’s Final Decision report for 
that business or industry.  In some instances the businesses proposed revenue 
requirements were not available in the Final Decision, when this was the case the 
businesses initial submission was used to obtain the data.  
 
The data that we use contains information on firm cost claims and allowable 
revenue set by the regulator for 254 annual observations on 52 separate projects 
(decisions).  (The average decision/project covers 5 years.)  The database and the 
STATA code for reproducing the results are available at www.acore.org.au.  
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Tables 1 and 2 summarise the data by industry and regulator.   
 
Table 1.  Observations (decisions) by regulator and industry 
 
 Regulator 
Industry ACCC Vic NSW QLD WA SA ACT 
Electricity 
Transmission 49(8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electricity 
Distribution 0 20(4) 30(6) 10(2) 0 0 10(2) 
Gas 
Distribution 0 35(7) 14(3) 12(2) 5(1) 4(1) 10(2) 
Gas 
Transmission 28(6) 0 0 0 10(2) 0 0 
Water 0 0 13(5) 4(1) 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.  Mean of y by regulator and industry 
 
Industry ACCC Vic NSW QLD WA SA ACT  
Electricity 
Transmission .195 
           .195  
Electricity 
Distribution   .146 .080 .017    .093 .092 
Gas 
Distribution   .096 .115 .088 .054 .146 .137 .103 
Gas 
Transmission .139 
      .448     .221 
Water    .041 -.040       .022 
 .175 .114 .080 .041 .317 .146 .115 .130 
 
Before we present our empirical results, it is worth commenting on some 
peculiarities of the data. Firstly, in four ACCC decisions (two in electricity 
transmission and two in gas transmission), the firm’s claim covered an entire 
year but the allowable revenue only covered half of the year (ElectraNet, 2002; 
SPI Powernet, 2002; Epic Moomba to Adelaide, 2000; EAPL Moomba to Sydney, 
2003).  To include these years, we multiplied the allowable revenue by two and 
used the firm’s annual cost claim.  Omitting these half-year observations has only 
the most trivial effect on the results presented below.   
 
There were five decisions which we hesitated to include either because the firm 
reported multiple cost claims and we were unsure which cost claim(s) formed 
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the basis of the regulator’s decision or because we had other doubts about the 
data quality.  These decisions, which we discuss in more detail below, are: 
Gladstone Area Water Authority (QCA), TXU (Esc-Victoria), Australian Inland 
(IPART), Energex (QCA), and Ergon (QCA).   The estimation results presented 
below include these decisions (based upon our best guess of which cost claims to 
use).  We also dropped these decisions and re-estimated our models, but none of 
the coefficients change sign or significance.   
 
In the Energex and Ergon decisions, there were several different proposals by the 
firm.  In the case of the other three decisions, we have an anomalous situation 
where the sum of the maximum allowable revenue over the entire regulatory 
period exceeds the firm’s claims. There are possible explanations for this. For 
example, it is possible that demand might have been underestimated in the 
original firm’s submission and that the regulator’s decision process revealed this.  
 
An additional peculiarity of the data is that there are no observations on y 
between .31 and .4.  There are 20 observations above .4.  They are generated by 
three projects:  MTC (Electricity Transmission, ACCC, October 2003); Goldfield 
Gas Pipeline (Gas Transmission, Offgar, April 2001); and Dampier to Bunbury 
(Gas Transmission, Offgar, May 2003).  These three projects create the bi-
modality in the data which can be observed in Figure 4.  We will later present 
hypothesis tests of our main hypothesis using only the state-regulation data from 
Gas Distribution, Water and Electricity Distribution (See Table 5).  This 
effectively estimates the model only on a subset of the data in the first mode 
which appears to be roughly normally distributed.  It is worth noting that this 
does not affect our results. 
 
To summarise, the results presented below include all the decisions from our 
database. Moreover, if we omit all the peculiar data, as described above, our 
estimates do not change in any significant way.  
 
We now present and discuss our initial results. The second column in Table 3 
reports the results of estimating equation 1.2 by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. Note that water is the omitted industry dummy and the ACCC the 
omitted regulatory agency. Therefore, the coefficients on the variables have to be 
interpreted as relative to the omitted dummies. A positive coefficient implies a 
less favourable treatment of firms’ claims vis-à-vis the omitted categories.  
 
The third column of Table 3 corrects for the fact that our data consists of 254 
observations from 52 different regulatory decisions and as such the individual 
observations are not independent.   While the standard errors change by a factor 
of two or three in some cases, these do not generate any substantive differences 
in the significance of coefficients between the two columns. 
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Both regressions include time dummies.  We group years 2009-2012 (5 
observations on two projects) and use this as the omitted category.  All of the 
time dummies for 1997 through 2008 are negative and significant.  If we include 
separate time dummies for 2009, 2010, and 2011, they are—unsurprisingly--not 
significantly different from zero, further confirming our decision to group these 
dummies.  Refinements such as replacing the time dummies with a time trend 
have no significant effect on the coefficients of interest.    
 
The results reported in Table 3 suggest that gas and electricity distribution are 
treated similarly despite being regulated by different regulators at the various 
states and territories.  By the same token, gas and electricity transmission seem to 
be treated similarly.  It is obvious from the coefficients and their standard errors 
that these three statements are confirmed by a formal hypothesis test. 
 
Table 3.  Coefficient estimates of 1.2 
 
 OLS Regression OLS Regression with 
clustered standard errors 
Industry  
Electricity Transmission .511** 
(.061)  
.511** 
(.064)  
Electricity Distribution .067** 
(.026)  
.067* 
(.029)  
Gas Distribution .076** 
(.028)  
.076** 
(.030)  
Gas Transmission  .471** 
(.057)  
.471** 
(.031)  
Regulatory Agency  
Victoria .372** 
(.054)  
.372** 
(.038)  
NSW .358** 
(.056)  
.358** 
(.036)  
Queensland .306** 
(.056)  
.306** 
(.047)  
Western Australia .306** 
(.034)  
.306** 
(.025)  
South Australia .395** 
(.070)  
.395** 
(.024)  
ACT .366** 
(.057)  
.366** 
(.034)  
   
R-squared 50.5% 50.5% 
Sample size 254 254 
** Significant at 5% level 
*   Significant at 10% level 
 17
Another striking feature of the results from Table 3 is the similarity between the 
coefficients of the various state and territory regulators. This suggests that 
despite the many differences in approaches to the regulation of gas and 
electricity distribution and water across states and territories, their behaviour 
might be nevertheless consistent with each other. Below we pursue this 
similarity more formally. 
 
Finally, note that the positive coefficients on all dummy variables for state 
regulators would suggest that their decisions are less generous than that of the 
ACCC, the omitted variable. However, to understand this relationship one needs 
to take into account that the ACCC regulates gas and electricity transmission and 
the coefficients on these variables were substantially higher than the coefficients 
on the gas and electricity distribution variables.  It is also important to note (see 
Table 1) that all electricity transmission decisions included in our database were 
taken by the ACCC whereas gas transmission decisions were taken both by the 
ACCC (six decisions) and the Western Australian regulator (two decisions). 
 
 
4.1 Testing regulatory consistency 
 
  
Using the above regression results, it is straightforward to test whether the 
different state-based regulatory outcomes are consistent with one another.  There 
are two ways in which we approach this question.  The first is to consider 
pairwise tests between the coefficients for the different state regulators.  The 
second is to consider testing the equality of similar-appearing groups of 
states/territories. 
 
In Table 4 we present the p-values from the tests of pairwise comparisons across 
states and territories.  The p-values tell us the exact size of the test of equality.  
Thus a p-value of .2 indicates that we would just reject the test of equality with a 
test of level .2.  (We would reject equality at the 80% confidence level.)  The tests 
of Table 4 use the standard errors which are corrected for clustering. 
 
Table 4: Test of equality of state/territory coefficients 
 VIC NSW QLD WA SA ACT 
VIC  .69 .13 .02** .47 .84 
NSW   .17 .07* .20 .81 
QLD    .99 .04** .13 
WA     .00** .02** 
SA      .26 
Test of equality of SA, VIC, NSW and ACT .55 
p-values of test of coefficient equality 
**different at the 5% level 
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We also present the p-value for the test of joint equality between South Australia, 
New South Wales, Victoria, and the ACT.   We can not reject the consistency of 
these four regulators.  Nor can we reject the consistency between Queensland 
and Western Australia.   
 
The state-by-state comparisons also lend support to their being two groups—one 
formed of Queensland and Western Australia and the other of the remaining 
state and territory regulators.   When we use the standard errors from the 
standard OLS regression, we get a strong rejection of the equality of Queensland 
compared individually to New South Wales, Victoria, and the ACT.  When we 
use the standard errors corrected for clustering we get p-values between .13 and 
.16.  At the 10% level, if we applied a one-sided test that the Queensland is 
associated with a higher y than the ACT, South Australia, New South Wales, and 
Victorian regulators, we would conclude that this is indeed the case.   
 
Western Australia is the only state that regulates gas transmission and it may be 
that the coefficient for Western Australia is heavily influenced by these 
observations.  Therefore, to verify the validity of the above conclusions, we re-
estimate the model using only the observations involving electricity and gas 
distribution and water.  These are the main industries regulated by states (see 
Table 1) and the industries where for each industry there are at least two states 
involved in regulation.   
 
In Table 5, we present the p-values from the tests of state-by-state equality and 
the grouped equality of South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, and the 
ACT.   (Regression results are available from the authors.)  Our tentative 
conclusions that Queensland and Western Australia are consistent with one 
another, but associated with lower ys than South Australia, New South Wales, 
Victoria, and the ACT (who are consistent with one another) is sharpened. 
 
Table 5: Test of equality of state/territory coefficients 
(Excluding gas transmission from industries considered) 
 
 VIC NSW QLD WA SA ACT 
VIC  .90 .13 .01** .56 .56 
NSW   .099* .02** .42 .42 
QLD    .90 .046** .03** 
WA     .00** .00** 
SA      .96 
Test of equality of SA, VIC, NSW and ACT .82 
p-values of test of coefficient equality 
**different at the 5% level 
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The difficulty in assessing whether the ACCC is associated with higher or lower 
ys than the state regulators is the lack of overlap in the industries being 
regulated.  The significant, positive coefficients on the state regulators in table 3 
indicate that the ACCC is less tough than the state regulators.  But the large 
significant coefficients on gas and electricity transmission (mostly regulated by 
ACCC in the case of the former and only by ACCC in the case of the latter) may 
be interpreted to mean that the ACCC is tougher.   
 
Holding year constant, electricity transmission regulated by ACCC has an 
average value of y predicted from the model of .405.  (Without the constant and 
year effects, both of which are negative.)  Electricity distribution regulated by 
NSW has a predicted value of y of .332.  The difference is significant, but we are 
econometrically unable to split the difference into that due to the regulator and 
that due to the fact that the industry being regulated is different.  There are no 
examples of state-regulated electricity transmission (or ACCC regulated 
electricity or gas distribution or water) that would allow us to split this 
difference into these two pieces. The coefficients in table 3, by omitting ACCC, 
attribute all of the difference to the industry and none to the regulator.   
 
In Table 6, we present the polar opposite case, where all the difference is 
attributed to the regulator and none to the industry.  We impose common 
coefficient on New South Wales, ACT, and Victoria (confirmed by a test of 
equality).   That is, the equation we are estimating is  
 
(1.3) ' ' ,
rirt t irt
y RD TDα β δ ε= + + +  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Coefficient estimates of (1.3) 
 
 OLS Regression with 
clustered standard errors 
Regulatory Agency  
Victoria/ACT/ New 
South Wales (grouped) 
-.065* 
(.036)  
South Australia -.019 
(.030)  
Western Australia .152 
(.116)  
Queensland -.125** 
(.047)  
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If we test the hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on the New South 
Wales/ACT/Victoria group against the ACCC, we reject the null in favour of the 
alternative that the ACCC is tougher at the 10% level (p-value is .07).   Likewise 
the ACCC is tougher than Queensland.  There appears to be no difference 
between the ACCC and South Australia, although it’s notable that there are few 
observations for South Australia.  
 
Both the ACCC and Western Australia appear tougher than the other states, 
although this may be driven by differences between the regulation of gas 
transmission (only done by Western Australia and the ACCC) and other 
industries.  These differences are evident in the means presented in Table 2.  
Again, we have no statistical way of separating out these differences. 
 
 
4.2 Private vs. Public Ownership 
 
A common view is that privately owned firms might play the regulatory game 
more aggressively, by overstating their costs, than publicly owned companies. 
The underlying reason is that as shareholders individuals might be more profit-
driven than the government. A contrary view suggests that private companies 
might actually be less capable of overstating their costs given that they are 
subjected to more public scrutiny (e.g., by their many shareholders) than their 
public counterparts.  
 
To pursue this issue we split our sample according to the nature of ownership 
(public vs. private). Tables 7 and 8 summarise the data. There is a small 
difference between regulatory decisions across privately and publicly owned 
companies.  
 
 
 
Table 7.  Observations (decisions) by private/public and industry 
 Regulator 
Industry ACCC Vic NSW QLD WA SA ACT 
Private 65 (11) 35 (7) 48 (12) 20 (4) 15(3) 0 20(4) 
Public 12 (3) 20 (4) 9 (2) 6 (1) 0 4(1) 0 
 
 
Table 8.  Mean of y by regulator and private/public 
Industry ACCC Vic NSW QLD WA SA ACT  
Public .131 .146 .097 .172   .146   .137 
Private  .183 .096 .076 .001 .317   .115 .128 
 .175 .114 .080 .041 .317 .146 .115 .130 
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To investigate whether this difference in the descriptive statistics has any effect 
on our substantive results or increases the explanatory power of our model, we 
re-estimate equations (1.2) and (1.3) incorporating this new categorical variable.   
The private variable is negative and significant in equation (1.2)--consistent with 
the lower y for privately-owned firms in the descriptive statistics.  Inclusion of 
the private variable only seems to affect the results for South Australia.  The 
significant differences between South Australia and Queensland and South 
Australia and Western Australia become marginally insignificant.   However, we 
continue to find that  South Australia can be grouped with Victoria, New South 
Wales and the ACT.  In every other respect our substantive conclusions remain 
the same.   In equation (1.3), the private variable is insignificant.  The complete 
regression results are available from the authors. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The issue of regulatory consistency – the notion that regulatory decisions should 
not favour particular industries or firms in particular jurisdictions – has been 
raised as one of the rationales for the establishment of the new Australian Energy 
Regulator.  This is not surprising given the different approaches to the 
implementation of price regulation in electricity and gas distribution and 
transmission across jurisdictions.  Similarly, a national water policy is again a 
high priority in the political agenda and the scope for significant differences in 
price regulation across jurisdictions might result in distortions in the 
implementation of competition policy arrangements.   
 
In this paper we provide evidence that despite the differences in the 
implementation of price regulation across industries and across jurisdictions in 
Australia, there is a considerable degree of consistency in regulatory decisions. 
 
Firstly, our results suggest that when we control for different regulators and 
different time periods, regulatory decisions are reasonably consistent across the 
electricity and gas distribution industries. The apparent lack of consistency 
between transmission and distribution has to be taken more cautiously given 
that the ACCC is the only regulator for electricity transmission in our sample and 
so it is impossible to statistically separate the regulator and industry effects.  
 
Secondly, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the regulatory outcomes 
in South Australia, New South Wales, the ACT and Victoria are similar. We also 
provide evidence that the Queensland and Western Australia regulators are 
consistent with one another, but are associated with regulatory outcomes that 
seem tougher than those of the other state regulators.   
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This empirical evidence of course does not allow us to conclude that initiatives 
such as the establishment of the Australian Energy Regulator are not necessary – 
indeed the new national regulator might result in a reduction in the direct costs 
of regulations by eliminating duplication of efforts – but instead it highlights an 
important topic for further investigation: the mechanism by which this 
consistency in price regulation has been achieved. For example, is it the case that 
there exists a follower/leader relationship where some state regulators set the 
tone for other state regulators?  
 
Furthermore, we find the nature of ownership of regulated companies does not 
affect the conclusions stated above.  Moreover, on its own, the public/private 
variable has no statistically significant influence on the percentage of costs which 
the regulator allows the firm to recover. 
 
Finally, we would like to be able to assess how the regulatory decisions taken by 
the federal regulator, the ACCC, relate to those taken by the state regulators. The 
difficulty in conducting this assessment is the lack of overlap in the industries 
being regulated.  We provide some lower and upper bounds that are consistent 
with both the notion that the ACCC is tougher and that it is less tough than state 
regulators.   
 
The implicit assumption we make when interpreting our results is that any 
gaming behaviour by firms (in overstating their costs) that is attributable only to 
a particular industry is captured by the industry specific dummies. Similarly, any 
gaming behaviour that occurs only when dealing with specific regulators is 
captured by the regulator specific dummies.  So our interpretation is still valid in 
the presence of gaming behaviour, provided that this behaviour is roughly 
constant across one of our included categories (time, industry, and/or regulator). 
 
If one takes the extreme view that regulators do own an efficiometer and can 
determine precisely the true efficient costs, then our conclusions should be 
interpreted as establishing that gaming or overstatement of costs is consistent 
across jurisdictions and across gas and electricity distribution. Of course, if this 
were true, our conclusion would have to be re-stated in terms of consistency of 
gaming behaviour – although this consistency of gaming has no impact on 
outcomes given the assumption that regulators possess an efficiometer.  
 
In addition, it is important to note that although we are able to explain fifty per 
cent of the variation on the data by using some very simple categorical variables 
(regulator, industry and time), there is still fifty per cent of the variance left to be 
explained!  This is also a subject of further research. 
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Further research will aim at extending the database to include observations from 
the UK, for example, where electricity transmission and distribution are 
regulated by the same regulator. Moreover, we intend to expand the dataset to 
include decisions in other industries such as transport and telecommunications 
and to include some political economy variables. This would allow us not only to 
answer the question relating to the ACCC but possibly also to uncover firm-
specific behaviour. 
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